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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction to decide this appeal is conferred upon the Court of Appeals by Sections
78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j), Utah Code Ann., since the Supreme Court has transferred to
the Court of Appeals this matter over which the Supreme Court had original appellate
jurisdiction, and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The issues asserted by Appellant St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company ("St.
Paul") on appeal are as follows:
1.

Whether a claim was made that would trigger an obligation or liability of

Appellee American Casualty Company of Reading PA ("American") under the insurance
policy it issued to Defendant Troy Alan Broka ("Broka'). The standard of appellate review
is one of correctness. Arnold Industries v. Love, 63 P.3d 721, 722 (Utah 2002). (See St.
Paul's Memorandum in Opposition to American's Motion for Summary Judgment dated
March 25, 2002, hereinafter, "St. Paul's Memorandum," (Record at 374).
2.

Whether St. Paul is precluded from pursuing a subrogation claim

against American. The standard of appellate review is one of correctness. See Id. at 722.
3.

Whether St. Paul is precluded from pursing a claim of equitable

contribution against American. The standard of appellate reviev/ is one of correctness. (See
Id. at 722.
4.

Whether the Third District Court erred in ruling that because no claim was

made directly against Broka, St. Paul has no subrogation or equitable contribution claims
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against American. The standard of appellate review is one of correctness. See Id. at 722.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The applicable standard of appellate review on appeal from a summary judgment
ruling in the state district court is a review for correctness with no deference given to the
district court's legal conclusions. Id. at 722.
Furthermore, in reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the facts and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom are to be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Id. at 722.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
By ruling on less than all issues and not reaching issues involving statutory
provisions, there are no statutory provisions that are determinative of this appeal.
STATEMENT OF CASE
A.

Background Information

Broka was employed by Appellant University of Utah Hospital ("Hospital") in April,
1997. Broka provided nursing care to a Hospital patient, Abel Hepworth ( "Hepworth") in
April, 1997. In the course of providing such care to Hepworth, Broka allegedly misread a
physician's order for infusing IV liquids and infused Hepworth with an excessive amount
of fluids causing Hepworth's death on April 14, 1997. Shortly after Hepworth's death, his
wife informed the Hospital of her intention, on behalf of herself and her minor children, to
commence legal action to recover for Hepworth's death.
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American provided and issued professional liability insurance to Broka. The
Hospital contacted American regarding the claim asserted by Mrs. Hepworth and invited
American's participation in settlement negotiations and tendered defense and
indemnification of Broka to American. American refused to provide coverage to Broka or
to participate in settlement negotiations with Mrs. Hepworth.
In settlement negotiations with Mrs. Hepworth, the Hospital settled her claim for
$1,323,523.00. The Hospital self-insured up to a retention of $1,000,000.00 and paid that
amount to Mrs. Hepworth in connection with such settlement. Appellant St. Paul provided
the Hospital with excess liability insurance coverage above $1,000,000.00 and paid the
remaining $323,523.00 of the settlement to Mrs. Hepworth.
Upon claims of subrogation and contribution, St. Paul seeks reimbursement from
American of the amount paid by St. Paul ($323,523.00) in connection with the Hepworth
settlement that should have been paid by American in connection with its liability policy
issued to Broka.
B.

The Parties' Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment.

On February 26, 2002, the Hospital moved for summary judgment against
American. The Hospital's Motion asserted that the insurance policy issued by American to
Broka, employed by the Hospital, was the primary insurance policy covering Broka for
negligence and wrongful death claims brought by third parties. The Hospital sought a
ruling from the District Court that American was primarily responsible to cover Broka and
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that American must reimburse the Hospital for monies expended to settle the claim arising
out of care rendered by Broka.
On March 1, 2002, American also moved for summary judgment against the
Hospital and St. Paul. American's Motion asserted that Broka was employed by a
governmental entity and was acting in the course and scope of his employment in
providing nursing care to Hepworth, and Broka was afforded immunity from incurring any
personal liability for an underlying wrongful death claim. American relied for support of
this argument on Section 63-30-1, Utah Code Ann., the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
Accordingly, American asserted that Broka was statutorily protected from having to
contribute to any settlement the Hospital made for claims within the scope of Broka's
employment.
Furthermore, American argued that because Broka would not have been legally
obligated to pay any amounts in connection with a settlement under any circumstance
present in the case, coverage under American's policy on Broka never triggered. American
contends that its policy only provides coverage for amounts that Broka is legally obligated
to pay. American argues that Broka was never legally obligated to pay, and the Hospital
and St. Paul are therefore not entitled to subrogation and/or equitable contribution from
American.
St. Paul joined in the Hospital's Memorandum Opposing American's Motion for
Summary Judgment. In addition, St. Paul argued that its asserted claim against American
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for equitable contribution precluded American being awarded summary judgment.
C.

The Third District State Court's Decision.

On September 6, 2002, the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki of the Third District Court
entertained oral argument with respect to the parties' motions. During the course of such
oral argument, St. Paul raised the issue of application in this matter of Article I, Section 11
of the Utah Constitution and argued that such provision renders unconstitutional sections
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act relied upon by American in support of its Motion.
All parties were allowed the opportunity to folly brief this issue following the hearing.
On October 7, 2002, the Third District Court issued its Memorandum Decision,
granting American's Motion for Summary Judgment. The University's Motion for
Summary Judgment was denied. The District Court concluded that the University
essentially conceded that Mrs, Hepworth made no "claim" within the meaning of the
American policy against Broka. The District Court went on to hold that this was critical
inasmuch as the American's policy was triggered only by a "claim" or an insured's legal
obligation to pay some amount. Broka never had any claim made directly against him and
never became legally obligated to pay anything to Ms. Hepworth in connection with the
Hospital and St. Paul settlement of the Hospital's liability. Consequently, the Court held
that none of American's obligations under the policy issued to Broka ever matured.
With respect to St. Paul, the Court held that there can be no claim for contribution
among insurers unless one insurer was equally obligated to provided coverage to the same

4

insurer for the same risk, yet failed to do so. The District Court went on to hold that the
obligations triggered by the Hepworth family's demands were those of the Hospital and its
insurer, St. Paul, for amounts in excess of the Hospital's retained limit. The Hepworths
made no demand that would have triggered the American Policy.
In light of the foregoing ruling, the District Court did not reach the issue of the Utah
Government Immunity Act, nor the constitutional issues surrounding the Act.
The Hospital and St. Paul now appeal the District Court's Order, to challenge the
ruling of the District Court for correctness.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 10, 1997, Hepworth was admitted to the Hospital for surgical repair of an
aneurysm in a cerebral artery. See Hospital's Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment, Statement of Undisputed Facts, ]f no. 3 (hereinafter, "Hospital's
Memorandum"), Record at 94. Broka was employed by the Hospital as a travel nurse and
provided nursing care to Hepworth. (Hospital's Memorandum, ^f no. 2, Record at 94).
In providing care to Hepworth, Broka negligently misread a physician's order for
the infusion of IV fluids, and infused Hepworth with an excessive amount of fluids at
500cc per hour instead of lOOcc per hour ordered by Hepworth 's treating physician.
(Hospital's Memorandum, f no. 3, Record at 94). Consequently, on April 14, 1997,
Hepworth died as a result of fluid overload from Appellee Broka 's incorrect administration
of fluids. (Hospital's Memorandum, f no. 3, Record at 94).
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American's professional liability insurance to Broka was in effect at all material
times. (Hospital's Memorandum, % no. 5, Record at 95). Broka's professional liability
coverage with American provided limited liability, in the event of a claim arising from the
rendering of professional nursing services by Broka, in the amounts of $1,000,000.00 for
each medical incident and $3,000,000.00 aggregate. (Hospital's Memorandum, f no. 5,
Record at 95).
Broka's American policy provided professional liability coverage to him for, among
other things, injury or damage caused by a medical incident arising out of care provided by
Broka. (Hospital's Memorandum, f no. 5, Record at 95).
The Hospital self-insured its employees with professional liability insurance with
Coverage up to $1,000,000.00 per occurrence. (Hospital's Memorandum, f no. 8, Record
at 96). St. Paul provided the Hospital with excess liability insurance coverage above the
Hospital $1,000,000.00 per occurrence self-retention amount. (See St. Paul's Amended
Complaint, f no. 8, Record at

*). Broka's professional liability insurance with

American is an excess insurance policy, or, in the alternative, is an escape insurance policy.
St. Paul provided to the Hospital, excess liability insurance coverage. (St. Paul's Amended
Complaint, ^J no. 101). The Hospital provided primary liability insurance coverage to

l

For some reason St. Paul's Complaint and Amended Complaint were not
included in the record prepared by the clerk in the District Court's office. Therefore, a
page citation to the record cannot be included. The clerk's office has been notified of
this oversight, and a copy of St. Paul's Amended Complaint is included in the Addendum
to this brief.
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Broka. (St. Paul's Amended Complaint, % no. 101) St. Paul and American provided
secondary liability insurance coverage to Broka. (St. Paul's Amended Complaint, f nos. 8
&10 1 )
Following the death of Hepworth, the Hospital was informed by his wife, Susan
Hepworth, acting individually and on behalf of the Hepworth's two minor children, Alex
Hepworth and Ammon Hepworth, that she intended to commence a lawsuit against the
Hospital and Broka based on the care provided to her husband by Broka. (Hospital's
Memorandum, % no. 4, Record at 94). Prior to commencing the lawsuit, Mrs. Hepworth
initiated settlement negotiations with the Hospital. (Hospital's Memorandum, ^f no. 4,
Record at 94).
On or about June 11, 1997, counsel for the Hospital informed American of the facts
involving Broka and invited American's participation in the settlement negotiations with
Mrs. Hepworth. (Hospital's Memorandum, Tf no. 9, Record at 96 and 152). By letter dated
July 17, 1997, American declined to participate in settlement negotiations with Mrs.
Hepworth. (Hospital's Memorandum, f no. 11, Record at 97).
Because Broka was an agent of the Hospital, and because his negligence caused Mr.
Hepworth's death, the Hepworth family's claims were subsequently settled by the Hospital
and St. Paul. (St. Paul's Amended Complaint, U no. 191). As part of such settlement, the
Hospital paid to the Hepworths $1,000,000.00, and St. Paul paid to the Hepworths
$325,523. (St. Paul's Amended Complaint, % no. 201).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
American's policy for excess insurance on Broka was triggered by a claim made
directly by the Hospital to American. American had a duty to provide coverage and
participate in the Hepworth settlement with the Hospital and St. Paul. Sound public policy
and a great weight of legal authority suggest that an insurer may receive notice of a claim
from sources other than the insured in order to trigger coverage. In this case, such notice
came from the primary insurer-Hospital to an excess insurer-American. Notice of a claim
from a source other than the insured is proper where notice of a claim involves a demand
for money against the insured involving a medical incident under the terms of the insurer's
policy, timely notice is given by a third party source to the insurer, notice of the claim does
not prejudice the insurer, and the notice allows the insurer adequate time to investigate the
claim to protect itself. Thus, the District Court's decision is incorrect and should be
overturned.
St. Paul's right to equitable contribution is not a matter of contract, but stems for
equitable principles designed to accomplish ultimate justice in the bearing of a specific
burden where two insurers provide excess coverage to the same insured for the same risk.
The right of contribution belongs to St. Paul individually. It is not based on any right of
subrogation to the rights of Broka, and it is not equivalent to "standing in the shoes" of
Broka. Therefore, St. Paul is entitled to equitable contribution from American in an
amount to be determined at the trial court level.
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ARGUMENT
I.

AMERICAN'S POLICY FOR EXCESS INSURANCE WAS TRIGGERED
BY A CLAIM MADE DIRECTLY BY THE HOSPITAL TO AMERICAN.
American's policy for excess insurance coverage on Broka was triggered by notice

of a claim which American first received from the Hospital It should make no difference
that a demand was not first made directly on Broka. Under the American policy, a claim is
defined as follows:
IV

ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS

"Claim" means the receipt by you [insured] of a demand for money or services
naming you and alleging a medical incident.
(Record at 133 emphasis in original, brackets added).
Accordingly, the insured is generally obligated to promptly inform the insurer when
a demand for money is made against the insurer involving a medical incident. Further,
under the American policy, the insured is obligated to report a claim once the insured is
aware of, or reasonably believes that, there may be a claim asserted against the insured. A
"claim," as above-defined by the American policy, means a demand for money alleging a
medical incident. The American policy does not define a claim as being triggered by the
insured's legal obligation to pay some amount to a person injured or damaged by the
insured in a medical incident. In other words, the insured is not obligated to give notice of
a claim to American only when he becomes legally obligated to pay such claim. Prompt
notice of a claim should be given once demand for money involving a medical incident is
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made. The American policy does not specify or limit from whom American must receive
such a demand. Often such a demand comes from the insured, but not always, and not
necessarily so.
An insurance company may learn of a claim or a potential claim against the insured
from a source other than the insured. In states that require a showing of prejudice before
coverage can be denied because of a breach of the notice provision of an insurance policy,
such third party notice should be deemed to satisfy the insured's notice requirement. See
generally Hanson v, Barmore, 779 P.2d 1360, 1362-63 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989); Standard
Oil Co, v. Hawaiian Ins, & Guar, Co., 654 P.2d 1345, 1348 n4 (Haw. 1982) (notice
received from other insured under policy was sufficient); McLaughlin v. Attorney 's Title
Guar. Fund, 378 N.E.2d 355, 360 (111.1978) ("where the insurance company has actual
notice of the loss or receives the necessary information from some other source, there is no
prejudice to the insurer from the failure of the insured to give notice of the claim "); Bibb v.
Dairyland Ins, Co,, 205 N.W.2d 495, 496 (MI. 1973) (notice received from insured party's
attorney was sufficient); Great Am. Ins, v. CG Tate Constr. Co., 265 S.E.2d 467, 472
(N.C.1980) (it does not matter from what source the insurance company eventually
receives notice); Lusch v, Aetna Cas, Sur, Co,, 538 P.2d 902, 904 (Or. 1975) (insurer is not
prejudice by insured's failure to give timely notice if "a third party notifies the insurer in
time for the insurer to adequately investigate the claim and protect itself")- This same
principle should apply by analogy to this case and the demand made by the Hospital upon
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American even though a demand was never made directly on nurse Broka.
Prompt notice of a claim should be given to the insurer in order that the insurer may
have an opportunity to acquire, through adequate investigation, full information about the
circumstances of a claim so that the insurer can protect itself. It should make no difference
whether notice of the claim is made directly upon the insured by demand letter, initiation
of formal legal proceedings against the insured or the like, or whether notice of the claim is
made directly upon the insurer from some source other than the insured. This is especially
true in this case where St. Paul raises a claim of equitable contribution against American
and does not stand in the shoes of Broka in order to seek such contribution from American.
In this case, American received prompt notice of the claim against Broka from the
Hospital within two months following Hep worth's death. American had every opportunity
to investigate and acquire full information about the circumstances of the claim. American
simply chose not to participate in settlement following receipt of notice of the claim from
the Hospital American was not prejudiced simply because it received notice of the claim
from the Hospital and not Broka.
Consequently, it makes no reasonable sense to require that a demand for money
alleging a medical incident must first be sent by the injured party to the insured, who is
then obligated to pass notice of the claim on to the insurer, rather than the injured party
sending notice of the claim directly to the insurer. Such a requirement suggests that a
person injured or damaged by a medical incident must possess a foreknowledge of the
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contract language of the insured's insurance policy which instructs that a demand must
first be made directly upon the insured. A person injured or damaged by an insured rarely,
if ever, has access to the insured's insurance policy in order for the person to determine
how and to whom such a demand should be made. It is unreasonable, contrary to sound
public policy, and against the greater weight of legal authority that an insurer such as
American be alleviated from its obligation to pay out on a claim for a related medical
incident involving one of its insureds where the insurer has collected a premium from its
insured, insured a risk, received prompt notice of the claim, and has been allowed the
opportunity to thoroughly investigate that claim, simply because notice of the claim was
made by the Hospital to American rather than to Broka himself.
Timely notice of the claim was given to American. American had every opportunity
to investigate the claim in order to protect itself just as if the claim had been given by
Broka directly to American. American was not prejudiced by notice from a third party
other than Broka. Consequently, American had a duty to provide coverage and participate
in the Hep worth settlement. The District Court's decision is incorrect and should be
overturned.
II.

CLAIM FOR EQUITABLE CONTRIBUTION.

St. Paul insured the Hospital and all of its employees, including nurse Broka, with
excess liability insurance coverage above the Hospital's one million dollars per occurrence
self-retention amount. St. Paul's limit of liability was five million dollars aggregate.
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American also insured Broka with a one million dollar limit of liability per each
"medical incident." American's limit of liability is three million dollars aggregate. Both
St. Paul and American insured the same insured, Broka, for the same risk. It makes no
difference that St. Paul also insured other employees of the Hospital under its excess policy
for similar risks.
Because both St. Paul and American insured Broka for the same risk, St. Paul is
entitled to equitable contribution from American for its portion of the loss paid by St. Paul
to the Hepworths. See Fireman 's Fund Ins. Co. v. Md. Casualty Co., 65 Cal. App. 4th
1279(1998).
St. Paul's right to equitable contribution is not a matter of contract, but stems from
equitable principles designed to accomplish ultimate justice in the bearing of a specific
burden where two insurers provide excess coverage to the same insured for the same risk.
See Id. at 1295.
The right of equitable contribution belongs to St. Paul individually. It is not based
on any right of subrogation to the rights of Broka, and it is not equivalent to "standing in
the shoes" of Broka. Such right to contribution is therefore not limited to traditional
subrogation defenses or to any argument that Broka, having himself paid no claim, has no
claim against American. The California Court of Appeals in Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.
explained the following with respect to the doctrine of equitable contribution:
, . . [T]he reciprocal contribution rights of coinsurers who insure the same risk are based on the
13

equitable principal that the burden of indemnifying or
defending the insured with whom each has independently
contracted should be borne by all of the insurance
carriers together, with the loss equitably distributed
among those who share liability for it in direct ratio to the
proportion each insurer's coverage bears to the total
coverage provided by all of the insurance policies.
Id. (Emphasis added).
St. Paul's claim for equitable contribution is not precluded by any argument that
American stands in the shoes of Broka, or that Broka has no claim against American,
because St. Paul is not required to stand in the shoes of Broka or the Hospital with
respect to Broka's defenses and thus become subject to the defenses. Neither does the
fact that Gulf Ins. Co. v. Horace Mann Ins. Co. 567 P.2d 158 (Utah 1977), relied upon by
American, places American in Broka's shoes preclude St. Paul's claim for equitable
contribution against American. The right of equitable contribution is not derivative and
is not dependent upon any rights of other parties, including Broka and the Hospital. St.
Paul's contribution claim is not a claim based upon subrogation to another person 's
rights, but is a claim arising directly in St. Paul by reason of it having paid a claim for
which American also had responsibility.
The Fireman's Fund court stated:
Equitable contribution is entirely different [from
subrogation]. It is the right to recover, not from the party
primarily liable for the loss, but from a co-obligor who shares
such liability with the party seeking contribution. . . .Where
multiple insurance carriers insure the same insured and cover
the same risk, each insurer has independent standing to
14

assert a cause of action against its co-insurers for equitable
contribution when it has undertaken the defense or
indemnification of the common insured. Equitable
contribution permits reimbursement to the insurer that paid
on the loss for the excess it paid over its proportionate share
of the obligation, on the theory that the debt it paid was
equally and concurrently owed by the other insurers and
should be shared by them pro rata in proportion to their
respective coverage of the risk. The purpose of this rule of
equity is to accomplish substantial justice by equalizing
the common burden shared by coinsurers, and to prevent
one insurer from profiting at the expense of others.
Fireman 's Fund, supra 1293. (Emphasis added).
"Unlike subrogation, the right to equitable contribution exists independently of
the rights of the insured." Id. at 1295. St. Paul's right to contribution from American
stems from the fact that St. Paul insured and paid out on an insured and on a risk that
American also insured and upon St. Paul's independent standing under such
circumstances to recover contribution directly from American. Therefore, St. Paul is
entitled to equitable contribution from American in the amount of one-half or
$162,761.50 of the $325,523.00 paid out by St. Paul on the Hepworth settlement.
CONCLUSION
St. Paul is entitled to and requests a ruling of this Court that the District Court's
decision is incorrect and that American's Motion for Summary Judgment should be
denied.
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ADDENDUM
Attached hereto are date-stamped copies of the Final Order and Judgment, the
District Court's Memorandum Decision upon which such Final Order and Judgment are
based, and St. Paul's Amended Complaint.
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THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
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Plaintiffs University of Utah and University of Utah Hospital's Motion for Summary
Judgment (in which plaintiff St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company joined), defendant
American Casualty Company of Reading PA's Motion for Summary Judgment, and American"
Casualty's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Lynn Faldmo came on for hearing before the Court
on September 6, 2002. Following the hearing, St. Paul and American Casualty submitted
supplemental briefing.
Having heard oral argument and having read and considered all papers and supporting
documents submitted in connection with the parties' motions, the Court issued a memorandum
decision dated and signed October 7, 2002, wherein the Court granted American Casualty's
Motion for Summary Judgment, denied the University's Motion for Summary Judgment and
denied American Casualty's Motion to Strike.
For the reasons set forth in the Court's October 7,2002 memorandum decision, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT JUDGMENT BE ENTERED
FORTHWITH in favor of defendant American Casualty Company of Reading, PA and against
plaintiffs the University of Utah and University Hospital and St. Paul Fire and Marine InsuranceCompany and that plaintiffs' lawsuit against American Casualty be dismissed with prejudice.

DATED this

s^s

dayof

if&z

*

2002.
)URT:

The Honorable GlennTC
Third Judicial District Court Judge

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HOSPITAL and
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH
Plaintiffs,
vs.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY dba CNA
INSURANCE COMPANIES, an
Illinois corporation,
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Hon. GLENN K. IWASAKI

Defendant.
Court Cleric: Janet Banks
October 4, 2002
ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE
INSURANCE, COMPANY, a Minnesota
corporation,
Plaintiff,

j

vs.
AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF
READING, PA and TROY ALAN
BROKA,
Defendants.
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
Cross Motions for Summary Judgment and American Casualty Company of
Reading, PA's Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Lynn
Faldmo. The Court heard oral argument with respect to the motions
on September 6, 2002. Following the hearing, the Court granted the
parties time for additional briefing.
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the additional

briefing and

considered the motions, memoranda, exhibits attached thereto and
for the good cause shown hereby enters the following ruling.
Addressing first the Motion to Strike, after reviewing the
Affidavit and Supplemental Affidavit of Ms. Faldmo, the Court is
persuaded it is subject to appropriate exceptions to the hearsay
rule and, further, any deficiencies with regard
knowledge have been cured.

to personal

Accordingly, the motion is denied.

Turning next to the Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, the
plaintiffs, University of Utah and University of Utah Hospital
(collectively "the University") settled a claim brought by a widow,
Susan Hepworth, whose husband died, allegedly due to a nurse's
negligence. The University secured an agreement from Mrs. Hepworth
releasing it and its agents and employees from all liability
connected with the patient's death and paid $1 million of its own
money to help settle the lawsuit.1
With this Complaint, the University seeks subrogation and
contribution.
this

Court

Specifically, the University seeks a ruling form
that

American

Casualty

Company

of

Reading,

PA

("American") is the primary insurance policy covering the nurse,

*The University's lawsuit was consolidated with a lawsuit
brought by St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company against
American.
St. Paul also seeks reimbursement for monies it
contributed to the settlement.
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Troy Alan Broka ("Nurse Broka"), and that American is, therefore,
primarily responsible for covering Nurse Broka, and, consequently,
must

reimburse

the

University

for

monies

paid

toward

the

settlement.2
With their motion for summary judgment, the University asks
this Court to Rule as a matter of law that American is Nurse
• Broka's primary

insurance carrier.3

Specifically, notes the

University, American asserts the other insurance clause in the
policy issued to Nurse Broka makes the policy excess to the
University's self-insurance program.4 This is nonsensical, asserts
the University, as Nurse Broka did not have his own self-insurance
program and although the University has a self-insurance program,
the clause does not state that it extends to "self-insurance

2

The University is self-insured for professional liability
claims up to $1 million-when there is not insurance available to
cover the particular claim.
3

'A determination of amount is not sought.

"Section VII OTHER INSURANCE provides:
If other valid and collectible insurance is
available to you for a claim we cover under
this policy, our obligations are limited as
follows:
Excess Insurance
This insurance is excess over any other
insurance,
self-insurance,
self-insured
retention
or similar
programs, whether
primary, excess, contingent or on any other
basis.
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Indeed, argues the University, it never

reviewed the policy and never agreed to act as Nurse Broka's
primary liability insurance.
Next, the University asserts American's interpretation of
"other insurance" is overboard and renders the policy worthless as
hospitals have risk allocation systems in place, whether through
self-insurance programs or insurance policies and under American's
view of the clause, it would never need to pay a claim against one
of its insureds because the hospital that employed the nurse will
always be self-insured or have its own insurance coverage.
Moreover, it is the University's position that even if the
"other insurance" clause is interpreted as American urges, the
clause runs counter to public policy requiring an insurer to cover
an insured when it bargained for the risk and received premium
payments.

Finally, contends the University, Utah courts will not

enforce an insurance clause that serves to deprive the insured of
coverage when the clause could not easily be found by the insured.
American opposes the motion

and

brings its own motion for

summary judgment arguing the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and
controlling Utah case law, together, preclude Nurse Broka from
incurring any personal liability for the underlying wrongful death
matter and further prohibit the University or its insurer from
seeking indemnification from the University's employees or their

UNIVERSITY v. AMERICAN
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employees' insurers in such circumstances.5

Moreover, argues

American, it only insured Nurse Broka, who never had any monetary
demands directly asserted against him by the underlying claimants.6
Specifically, American notes that according to plaintiffs'
complaint in this action, Nurse Broka negligently administered
excess intravenous fluids to Mr. Hepworth, allegedly causing or
contributing to Mr. Hepworth's death four days later.

It is

American's position, however, that plaintiffs have not alleged
Nurse Broka was acting outside the course and scope of his duties
in connection with those acts.

Further, argues American, there

were several other employees at the University who were potentially
responsible for any excess administration of fluids or surrounding
events.
The University opposes. American's cross motion arguing the
Governmental Immunity Act does not bar the University's claims for
subrogation

and

equitable

subrogation.

Specifically,

University notes Utah Code Ann. §63-30-38 states

the

that if a

5

Indeed, asserts American, allowing the University or St. Paul
to recover from Nurse Broka's insurer, when they are barred by
statute from recovering from Nurse Broka, would abrogate the
purpose of the Governmental Immunity Act.
*With respect to St. Paul, American contends it insured the
University and all of its employees and the settlement was designed
to cover every employee of the University who was involved in
providing care to Mr. Hepworth. In sum, it is American's position
St. Paul did no more than protect its own interests and those of
its insureds by its participation in the Hepworth settlement.
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governmental entity settles a claim against an employee, "the
employee7' may not be required to indemnify the entity.

This

section, argues the University, does not say that the employee's
private insurer does not need to indemnify the entity. Similarly,
asserts the University, Utah Code Ann. §63-30-33(1) (c) states that
a governmental entity's "insurer" has no right of indemnification
or contribution from the employee.

While the legislature was

careful to protect employees from indemnifying their employer, it
is the University's position they did not draft a provision
preventing the governmental employer from seeking indemnification
from the employee's insurer.

Additionally, with respect to the

cases cited by American, the University notes that none address the
situation where insurer was a self-insured governmental body.
Furthermore,

argues

the

University,

if

American's

interpretation of the Act were correct, the policy it provided to
Nurse Broka would be worthless.

Indeed, contends the University,

American maintains that under the Act the University would be
solely

responsible

for

losses

occasioned

by

its

insured's

negligence and that its policy would never be triggered because
Nurse Broka supposedly would never be "legally obligated to pay"
due to his employer's duty to indemnify him.

According to the

University, when American was initially invited to participate in
the Hepworth settlement, they refused solely on the basis of the

UNIVERSITY v. AMERICAN
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"other insurance" exclusion in the policy.
the

University,

Governmental

American

Immunity Act

waived
as

an

any

Consequently, argues

right

excuse

to

of its

assert

the

obligation

to

contribute.
Finally, the University contends it does not matter that Mrs.
Hepworth

did not demand

the money directly

from Nurse Broka.

Specifically, the University notes that its subrogation claim is
against American, not Nurse Broka, and American was on notice from
the outset that a third party was pursuing a claim arising from its
insured's negligence.7
St. Paul joins in the University's opposition and argues in
addition that because both it and American insured Nurse Broka for
the same risk, St. Paul is entitled to equitable contribution from
American

for its portion of the loss paid by St. Paul to the

Hepworths.

Indeed, notes

St. Paul,

contribution

(not subrogation) is

not

its claim

for equitable

p r e c l u ded by any argument

that American stands in the shoes of Broka, because St. Paul is not
required to stand in the shoes of the Hospital with respect to
Broka's defense and, thus, becomes subject to the defense.
right of

equitable

contribution

The

is not derivative and is not

'It is the University's position American's duty does not
depend upon Nurse Broka's receipt of a demand for money. Indeed,
notes the University, the policy defines "claim" as "receipt by you
incident''

" ^

"

SerViCeS n3ming yOU and

a 1 1

* ^

a medical
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dependant upon anv riahts sna^^t- • J
y ri ncs a
^
9
gamst indemnity the Broka may have
under the Act.
Summary judgment is appropriate only if no genuine issue of
material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).

"In considering a

summary judgment motion, the Court must evaluate all the evidence
and all reasonable inferences fairh, ^..m -P
1Les

4-U

rairly drawn from the evidence in the

light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment."
Cinder v. A.L. Wi 11 i WJU&S3SUU,

739 P.2d 634, 634 (Utah Ct. App.

1987) .
Applying the aforementioned to the facts of this case, it is
important to note the University essentially concedes that the
Hepworths made no "claim" within +-K~
•
^ *.,_
witnin the meaning of the American policy
against Nurse Broka. This is critical as the American's policy is
only triggered by a "claim" or an insured's legal obligation to pay
some amount. In other worHc: M„, r. i
uuner words, Nurse Broka never had any claims made
against him and never became legally obligated to pay anything to
the Hepworths in connection with the University's and St. Paul's
settlement

of

the

University's

liability

to

the Hepworths.

Accordingly, none of American's obligations under the policy it
issued to Nurse Broka p w r ™^*.
J
„
ever matured. Consequently, American is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
With respect to St
Pa„i <-u
^L- Paul, there can be no claim for
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contribution

among insurers „ n i ^
y insurers unless one insurer was equally
obligated to provide coveraae 1-0 f ho
overage to the same insurer for the same
risk, yet failed to do so
Hor0 •.*,« u, •
° so. Here the obligations triggered by the
Hepworths' demands were those of K, 0 n •
•
cnose of the University and its insurer,
St. Paul, for amounts in excess of the University's retained limit.
The Hepworth's made no demand that would have triggered the
American policy.
Based
Judgment is

upon

the f o r g o l n g , ^

granted.

s r i c a n

.

s

Motion

for

Sumary

consequently, the University's motion is,

respectfully, denied.8
DATED this _ 7 _ day of October, 2002.

TLENN K.* IWASAKI
DISTRICT COURT JU

issue'of thfutah Governmental ±rm m^u n il t ^A c C ° U r t d ° e S n 0 t r e a c h t h e
issues surrounding the Act
y t, nor the const itutional
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE
INSURANCE COMPANY, a
Minnesota Corporation.

'
AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,

;

vs.

]
Civil No.: 990908784

CONTINENTAL CASUALTY dba CNA
INSURANCE COMPANIES, an Illinois
Corporation, and Troy Alan Broka,
Defendants.

;
Judge: Glenn K. Iwasaki
]
'

For Claims against Defendants, Plaintiff alleges as follows:
PARTIES AND JURISDICTION
1. Plaintiff is a Minnesota Corporation Licensed and qualified to do business as an insurance
company in the State of Utah.
2. Defendant Continental Casualty dba CNA Insurance Companies (hereinafter "CNA") is
an Illinois corporation registered to do business, and doing business, as an insurance company in the
State of Utah.

3. Defendant Troy Alan Broka (hereinafter "Broka") is an individual who caused injury in
the state of Utah as hereinafter alleged and who is subject to jurisdiction of this court as a resident
of the state of Utah, or, as a non resident, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-27-24.
4.

Venue and jurisdiction are proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-13-4, 7,

Section 31 A-l-105, and Section 78-3-4.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
5.

Broka at all relevant times was employed by the University of Utah Hospital and the

University of Utah (hereinafter collectively the "Hospital") as a travel nurse.
6. At all relevant times, CNA provided nursing professional liability insurance to Broka,
issued through American Casualty Company, which was in effect at all times material to the claims
herein asserted.
7. A copy of Broka's certificate for the aforementioned professional liability policy with
CNA is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this reference.
8. Broka's professional liability coverage provided limits of liability, in the event of a claim
arising from the rendering of professional nursing services by Broka, in the amounts of $1,000,000
for each medical incident and $3,000,000 aggregate.
9.

Broka's CNA policy provided professional liability coverage to him for, among other

things, injury or damages caused by a medical incident arising out of care provided by Broka.

2

10.

At all relevant times, Plaintiff provided the Hospital with excess liability insurance

coverage above a $1,000,000 per occurrence self retention amount.
11. While working in the Hospital, Broka provided nursing care to Abel Hepworth, who
was admitted on April 10, 1997 for surgical repair of an aneurysm in a cerebral artery.
12. In providing care to Mr. Hepworth, Broka negligently misread a physician's order for
the infusion of IV fluids and infused Mr. Hepworth with an excessive amount of fluids at 500cc. per
hour instead of the 100 cc. Per hour ordered by the physician.
13.

As a result of a fluid overload suffered by Mr. Hepoworth from such incorrect

administration of fluids, Mr. Heepworth died on April 14, 1997.
14. Shortly following the death of Mr. Hepworth, the Hospital was informed by his wife,
Susan Hepworth, acting individually and on behalf of the Hep worths' minor children, Alex Hepworth
and Ammon Hepworth (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the Hepworths"), that she intended
to commence a lawsuit against the Hospital based on the care provided to her husband by Broka;
specifically, the excessive administration of fluids.
15. Prior to commencing a lawsuit, Mrs. Hepworth initiated settlement negotiations with the
Hospital.
16. On or about June 11,1997, counsel for the Hospital informed CNA of the aforementioned
facts involving Broka and invited CNA's participation in the settlement negotiations with Mrs.
Hepworth.
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17. By letter of July 17, 1997, CNA declined to participate in settlement negotiations.
18.

On or about July 10, 1997, counsel for the Hospital tendered the defense and

indemnification of Broka to CNA. CNA did not respond.
19. Because Broka was an agent of the Hospital and because his negligence caused Mr.
Hepworth's death, the Hepworths' claims were subsequently settled by the Hospital and Plaintiff.
20. As a part of such settlement, the University paid the Hepworths $ 1,000,000, and Plaintiff
paid them $323,523.
21. The settlement amounts paid to the Hepworths were paid as a result of and arising out
of the negligent care rendered by Broka.

CLAIM ONE
(Subrogation - Breach of Duty to Defend-CNA)
22. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by this reference the foregoing paragraphs 1
through 21 inclusive.
23. By CNA's failure to participate in the settlement and failure to defend Broka against the
aforementioned claims, CNA breached the duty arising under its policy to defend Broka.
24. Because CNA breached its duty to defend Broka, the Hospital and Plaintiff paid such
defense costs, and PlaintifFis therefore subrogated and entitled to recover defense costs incurred and
paid by it, plus interest, from CNA.
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25. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against CNA for the costs and attorneys'
fees of Plaintiffs participation in negotiating and defending the Hepworths' claims arising out of the
care provided by Broka in an amount to be proven at trial, with interest thereon at the legal rate.

CLAIM TWO
(EQUITABLE SUBROGATION- CNA)
26. Plantiff realleges and incorporates herein by this reference the foregoing paragraphs 1
through 21 inclusive.
27. By CNA's failure to participate in the settlement and failure to defend Broka against the
aforementioned claims, CNA failed to comply with its policy provisions requiring it to pay all
amounts up to policy limits for which Broka became legally obligated to pay as a result of injuries
caused by a medical incident arising from care provided by Broka.
28.

Because CNA breached its duty to pay such amounts, Plaintiff is subrogated to and

entitled to recover from CNA the $323,523 paid by Plaintiff to the Hepworths, plus interest thereon
at the legal rate.
29. Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to judgment against CNA in the amount of $323,523,
with interest thereon at the legal rate.
CLAIM THREE
(CONTRIBUTION-CNA)
30. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates herein by this reference the foregoing paragraphs 1
through 21, inclusive.
5

31. CNA and Plaintiff both provided liability insurance coverage to Broka.
32. CNA's insurance provided first dollar coverage of $1,000,000 per occurrence, while
Plaintiffs insurance provided coverage for liability only in excess of $1,000,000.
3 3. CNA had the primary obligation to pay the first $ 1,000,000 of the Hepworth settlement.
34. If CNA had paid the first $ 1,000,000 of the Hepworth settlement, there would have been
no remaining liability for Plaintiff to pay after such payment by CNA and partial liquidation of and
payment from the Hospital's retention amount.
35. By payment of a portion of the Hepworth settlement, Plaintiff has discharged $323,523
of an obligation that, under the circumstances of coverage provided by Plaintiff and by CNA, Plaintiff
was not required to pay, and all of such payment was the obligation of CNA.
36. CNA is thus required to contribute to Plaintiff the entire $323,523 paid by Plaintiff, plus
interest thereon at the legal rate.
CLAIM FOUR
(SUBROGATION - BROKA)
37. Plaintiff reassets and includes herein by reference the foregoing paragraphs 1 through
21 inclusive.
38. Pursuant to and in conformity with its insurance coverage of the Hopsital, Plaintiff has
paid $323,523 to the Hepworths that was the obligation of Broka arising from his negligent and
improper treatment of Abel Hepworth.
39. Having paid such amount and obligation on behalf of the Hospital, Plaintiff, through its
arrangements with the Hospital, became subrogated to the Hospital's right to recover the amount
6

from Broka.
40. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against Broka for $323,523 plus interest
thereon at the legal rate.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests judgment against Defendants as follows:
1. Against CN A under Claim One for reimbursement of Plaintiff s defense costs in an amount
to be proven at trial, together with interest thereon at the legal rate;
2. Against CNA under Claim Two for $323,523, together with interest thereon at the legal
rate;
3. Against CNA under Claim Three for $323,523, together with interest thereon at the legal
rate;
4. Against Broka under Claim Four for $323,523, together with interest thereon at the legal
rate; and
5.

Against CNA and Broka for Plaintiffs costs herein incurred and such other relief,

including attorneys' fees, as is just and appropriate or the right to which may be established at trial.
DATED this /%Xday

of August, 1999.
CROWTHER & GARDNER

By ///I*'?*0**0* t'U ££-i^£^
Thomas N. Crowther
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Plaintiffs Address:
P.O. Box 5000
Brea, California 92822-5000
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The foregoing Amended Complaint was served upon Defendant by mailing a copy thereof,
postage pre-paid, to Henry E. Heath at Sixth Floor Boston Building, Nine Exchange Place, Salt Lake
City, Utah, 84111, this 18th day of October, 1999.

CROWTHER& GARDNER, PC.

Thomas N. Crowther
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